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Theories of onurrent systems have been exten-
sively investigated in the omputer siene domain.
However, these theories are very general in nature
and hene, we would argue, are appliable to many
disiplines in whih onurreny arises. Further-
more, a number of existing theories of ognitive
siene are onurrent in nature. Thus, we investi-
gate the appliation of a (proess aluli based) on-
urreny theory to modelling Interating Cognitive
Subsystems, whih is suh a (onurrent) ognitive
theory. Then we onsider the apabilities of the
ognitive system to perform ombinations of speeh
and gesture in multi-modal human omputer inter-
ation.
Keywords
Conurreny Theory, Interative Cognitive Subsys-
tems, Proess Caluli
INTRODUCTION
Many dierent notations have been used to desribe
ognitive models. For example, at least three dif-
ferent lasses of notation have been used to give
desriptions of the pivotal ognitive arhiteture
SOAR:
 natural language desriptions augmented with
box and arrow diagrams, e.g. [Newell, 1990℄;
 exeutable implementations, e.g. the Lisp and
C programs underlying the standard Soar im-
plementation; and
 even desriptions by [Milnes, 1992℄ in the for-
mal speiation notation Z, whih is a ombi-
nation of set theory, rst order logi and on-
struts for struturing speiations.
It is lear that the hoie of notation dramatially
aets the \value" of (even the ability to omplete)
a desription of a ognitive model. In a very general
sense, seletion of an appropriate modelling nota-
tion an be a major enabler to problem solving. To
take a familiar illustration, the uptake of the arabi
number system in the middle ages ruially enabled
the progress of arithmeti, e.g. the development of
arithmeti manipulation tehniques, suh as long
division, whih would have been infeasible with, for
example, the roman number system.
It is thus natural to believe that the identia-
tion of appropriate modelling notations, whih oer
a suitable level of abstration an aid the progress
of ognitive modelling. It is with suh identiation
in mind that the work reported here has been per-
formed. Speially, the underlying tenet for our
work is that a set of new tehniques from formal
omputer siene an be advantageously applied to
desribing and analysing ognitive models. These
tehniques have arisen out of the eld of onur-
reny theory .
Early onurreny theory work, whih yielded
petri nets, was followed in the 80's by the develop-
ment of a wealth of tehniques, e.g. ommuniating
automata, further petri nets researh, temporal log-
is and the tehniques we will be interested in in this
paper - proess aluli [Milner, 1989℄. Although
developed with omputer appliations in mind the
ore onepts of onurreny theory are ompletely
general and are appliable to modelling any variety
of onurrent system.
The relevane of onurreny theory to ognitive
modelling is that most ognitive theories are, at
some level, onurrent. For example, Soar on-
tains elements of onurrent behaviour. Further-
more, there has been reent interest in deentral-
ized models, where ognition is modelled in terms of
a olletion of independently evolving (and equally
statused) omponents, whih interat. The partiu-
lar suh arhiteture that we onsider is Interating
Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) [Barnard, 1998℄.
We have hosen ICS for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the arhiteture has been used suessfully
to analyse multi-modal human omputer intera-
tion, whih is the eld from whih this work has
arisen. Seondly, there has been previous work, e.g.
[Duke and Due, 1996℄ on modelling ICS with for-
mal methods
1
. Thirdly, the onurrent nature of
ICS suggests that from within the formal methods
anon, onurreny theory tehniques are an appro-
priate hoie.
The partiular area of ognitive siene our work
fouses on is analysis of ombinations of speeh and
gesture in multi-modal human omputer intera-
tion. In fat, this extended abstrat has grown
out of a large body of work we have performed
on desribing and analysing suh speeh/gesture
ombinations using ICS and proess aluli. The
omplete desription of this work runs to 90 pages
[Bowman, 1998℄. This extended abstrat sum-
marises some of the main issues surrounding this
work, without delving into the tehnial details.
We will rst give a very brief outline of ICS. Then
we disuss two reasons for using proess aluli to
model ICS - they allow onurreny to be modelled
diretly and they support abstrat speiation. We
then onsider how ognitive goals whih ombine
speeh and gesture an be analysed using proess




ICS adopts a \top down" approah to the design of
a ognitive theory by providing a framework on-
taining a set of ore omponents and mehanisms
that, it is argued, give a \potential design of a om-
plete mental mehanism" [Barnard, 1998℄.
We give a brief review of ICS, for a omplete
presentation the interested reader is referred to
[Barnard, 1998℄.
Representations and Subsystems. The basi
data item in ICS is the representation
2
. These are
past amongst the omponents of the arhiteture,
being transformed from one ode to another in eah
omponent. Thus, the arhiteture an be seen as
an information ow model.
The omponents of the arhiteture are alled
subsystems and all subsystems have the same gen-
eral format, whih is shown in gure 1 (above).
1
This term desribes the set ofmathematially based om-
puter siene speiation and analysis tehniques, of whih
onurreny theory tehniques are an example.
2
This term embraes all forms of mental odes, from \pat-
terns of shapes and olour" as found in visual sensory sys-
tems; to \desriptions of entities and relationships in seman-
ti spae" as found in semanti subsystems [Barnard, 1998℄.
image record
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Figure 1: Subsystem Format and Reading Cong.
Eah subsystem itself ontains omponents. For ex-
ample, representations reeived by a subsystem are
plaed in the input array . Eah subsystem ontains
a set of transformations whih take representations
from the input array, apply some transformational
operations to them and then relay a new (trans-
formed) representation to a target subsystem. Suh
transformations are also shown in gure 1 (below).
We do not onsider the image reord here.
The Arhiteture. Rather than present the full
ICS arhiteture we onentrate on a partiular
onguration of the arhiteture - a reading on-
guration, see gure 1 (below). Eah subsystem
is a speialization of the general subsystem format
just highlighted. The roles of the subsystems shown
are:-
 Visual (VIS) - reeives representations from the
eyes enoding \patterns of shapes and olour",
i.e. light wavelength (hue) and brightness;
 Morphonolexial (MPL) - works with an ab-
strat strutural desription of entities and re-
lationships in sound spae, i.e. lexial identities
of words, their status and order;
 Objet (OBJ) - works with an abstrat stru-
tural desription of entities and relationships in
visual spae, e.g. attributes of objets: shape
and relative position;
 Propositional (PROP) - works with desrip-
tions of entities and relationships in semanti
spae, i.e. gives semanti meaning to entities
and highlights the semanti relationships be-
tween entities;
Also the onurrent nature of the arhiteture
should be beoming lear - subsystems evolve simul-
taneously and independently subjet to interation
between subsystems when representation onvert-
ing transformations are performed.
Blending. Sensory subsystems, e.g. VIS, are a
ommon soure of representation ows. Eah repre-
sentation is then relayed within the arhiteture by
the ourrene of transformations
3
. Multiple ows
an exist in the arhiteture at the same time. The
arhiteture aommodates a number of dierent
outomes in this situation. However, the interest-
ing one is if an output transformation ats on a rep-
resentation whih is a ombination of two (or more)
\ompeting" input representations. This possibil-
ity leads to the onept of blending .
Representations from dierent ows an be
blended to reate a omposite representation. How-
ever, the nature of the blending depends upon the
ognitive task being onsidered. For example blend-
ing might only be possible if the two represen-
tations are, in some appropriate sense, onsistent
[Barnard, 1998℄.
CONCURRENCY
The majority of work on mathematial theories of
omputing has foused on systems, whih an be
ategorised as sequential . Suh systems an typi-
ally be viewed as input to output transformers. Al-
though perfetly adequate in the sequential setting,
suh transformational interpretations are insuÆ-
ient in the onurrent setting. Conurreny theory
has responded to this problem. It studies systems
ontaining a number of omponents that evolve si-
multaneously. Suh forms of onurrent behaviour
an be found throughout the dierent bands of og-
nitive ativity, e.g. the neuronal, neural iruit, og-
nitive operation and task levels [Newell, 1990℄.
With transformational systems the key issue is
what results the omputation terminates with, how-
ever with onurrent systems this is no longer the
ase. The interesting aspet of onurrent systems
is rather their ongoing behaviour and how ompo-
nents respond to external stimuli throughout the
system's life-time. Thus, onurrent systems are
modelled in terms of the order in whih they an
perform external interations.
3
There is atually a debate onerning how representa-
tions are relayed through the arhiteture. Here we assume
disrete transformation ring. This is a reasonable abstra-
tion for our purposes.
We have interpreted ICS using a parti-
ular tehnique from the onurreny the-
ory domain - the proess alulus LOTOS
[Bolognesi and Brinksma, 1988℄. This ontains
operators to desribe onurrent omponents and
interation between omponents. Our speiation
of ICS and a LOTOS introdution an be found in
[Bowman, 1998℄.
The priniple struturing onstrut in LOTOS
is the proess . A proess is an autonomous and
onurrently evolving entity, e.g. gure 2 (i) de-
pits three proesses - the big irles. Eah proess
ontains a number of interation points, the small
squares, at whih it an ommuniate with other
onurrently evolving proessses.
Clearly in a model onstruted with autonomous
omponents a mehanism needs to be provided
whih enables omponents to interat, e.g. the ar-
row in gure 2 (i). The synhronous rendez-vous
of proess aluli is suh a notion of interation.
When both proesses are ready, a synhronisation
and assoiated transfer of data ours. Suh prim-
itive interations yield the onept of an ation.
Interation in the ognitive domain an be on-
struted using the synhronous rendez-vous. For
example, interation in ICS is based on transfor-
mation ourenes. Suh events are modelled in the
LOTOS interpretation as ation exeutions. For ex-
ample, the ation instane,
vis obj?r:Rep
models the OBJ subsystem reeiving a representa-
tion (whih will be bound to the variable r) from
VIS on the transformation vis obj.
As an illustration of our speiation, assuming
we have denitions for all subsystems, we an build
the top level behaviour of ICS using parallel om-
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ready to perform it. As an illustration, the read-
ing sub-ongurations of ICS, whih we depited
in gure 1 (below), an be modelled using parallel
omposition as,
(( VISUAL(...) |[vis obj℄| OBJECT(...) )
|[obj prop,prop obj℄|
PROPOSITIONAL(...) )
|[obj mpl,prop mpl,mpl prop℄|
MORPHONOLEXICAL(...)
This states that the VISUAL and OBJECT sub-
systems evolve onurrently, while exhanging rep-
resentations via the transformation vis obj; whih
in turn evolve onurrently with the PROPOSI-
TIONAL subsystem while exhanging representa-
tions on obj prop and prop obj; and so on.
ABSTRACT SPECIFICATION
Importantly, formal speiations are in nature
very dierent to omputer programs or what we will
more broadly all implementations . A formal spei-
ation is abstrat in the sense that it haraterises
a set of possible implementations (the implementa-
tions that satisfy it), while a program haraterises
a single implementation - itself.
Assoiated with this aspet is the desire not to
overspeify (or in other terms to provide loose spe-
iation), i.e. that the nature of the speiation
language should not fore the speier to rule out
aeptable implementations. We believe this fea-
ture of formal speiation is very useful in the og-
nitive setting.
An important issue in modern ognitive siene
is, what has been alled, the irrelevant spei-
ation problem [Newell, 1990℄. In order to on-
strut a working simulation program a large num-
ber of assumptions have to be made, leaving it
unlear what aspet of the behaviour of the pro-
gram orresponds to known ognitive behaviour
and what arises from expedieny. For example
[Cooper et al., 1996℄ state,
\Computational models onate empiri-
ally justied mehanisms with pragmati
implementation details, and essential the-
oretial aspets of theories are frequently
hard to identify"
In fat, [Cooper et al., 1996℄ have diretly targeted
this issue. Their approah is to use a re-engineered
version of Prolog whih keeps the theoretial and
implementation assumptions disjoint, thus enabling
one to observe the onsequenes of hanging parti-
ular implementation assumptions.
The approah we advoate is even more radi-
al and further from onventional implementation
programming. We would argue that the irrelevant
speiation problem arises beause ognitive the-
ories are loser to speiations than implementa-
tions/programs. Cognitive theories typially leave
muh unexplained sine a omplete mehanisti in-
terpretation of ognition is not available. Thus, a
ognitive model is an abstrat desription of be-
haviour, for whih the implementation details an
be lled in in many ways. Using the terminology
of abstrat speiation, a partiular programming
implementation of a ognitive model is an imple-
mentation whih satises the ognitive model. Im-
portantly, it ertainly is not the ognitive model it-
self. Thus, our approah has been to speify ICS ab-
stratly, yielding a desription whih haraterises
many possible atual implementations.
A major way in whih abstrat speiation
is supported in proess aluli is through non-
determinism. This allows many possible behaviours
to be inluded in the same speiation, with the
hoie between them left unspeied. Suh non-
determinism is used in many plaes in our LOTOS
interpretation of ICS. For example, we use non-
determinism to model the ICS onept of blending.
As an illustration, we an dene a hierahy of in-
terpretations of blending ([Bowman, 1998℄ atually
presents a muh larger and more detailed hierar-
hy). For example, assuming a set Rep of repre-
sentations whih ontains a null element, denoted
null and that obj prop ats upon a blend of repre-
sentations r1 and r2 (whih have been plaed in the
OBJ input array from VIS and PROP), see gure 2
(ii), there are a number of possible ways of gener-
ating the new representation r and these possible
ways an be plaed in a hierahy, see gure 2 (iii),
aording to their level of non-determinism. We













Figure 2: Assorted Figures
1. r2Rep, i.e. randomly hosen from the set of all
possible representations;
2. r 2 fr1; r2g, i.e. a random hoie of r1 and r2;
3. r = if ons(r1; r2) then omp(r1; r2) else null
if r1 and r2 are \onsistent" then ompose them
together otherwise return null.
1. gives an upper bound on the level of non-
determinism - it is a ompletely non-deterministi
approah. Note that although the extreme non-
determinism inherent in 1. makes the approah og-
nitively strange, i.e. r has no relation to r1 or r2, this
is still an analytially useful interpretation. Speif-
ially, for analysis of many ognitive properties we
will only be interested (or may only need to be inter-
ested) in the blending whih ours at ertain sub-
systems and we an leave all other blending om-
pletely unspeied.
Approah 2. has a similar avour to approah 1.,
the dierene being that the set from whih the
representation is hosen is restrited to the two rel-
evant representations.
In ontrast, in approah 3. the two input repre-
sentations are ompared to determine if they are
onsistent, e.g. whether they are representations
with the same psyhologial subjet , if they are on-
sistent, a representation whih in some way om-
bines the features of the two input representations
is generated. Of ourse, there are many ways in
whih suh a ombined representation ould be on-
struted and these dierent approahes will arise
in dierent ognitive tasks, at dierent subsystems.
However, the important issue is that all suh ap-
proahes an be related aording to their level of
non-determinism.
One of the really nie aspets of how non-
determinism behaves in proess aluli, is that, not
only does it support abstrat speiation, it also
allows (simulated) exeution and proof based veri-
ation.
Simulated Exeution. A diÆult problem that
arises with \abstrat speiations" is how to pro-
vide \exeutable" realizations. For example, this
an be a problem if desriptions are given in pure
logi, e.g. in rst order or temporal logis. How-
ever, while being abstrat, proess aulus desrip-
tions are still \algorithmi" and an thus, be exe-
uted using a simulation engine. The approah is
that the speiation is run, with the user of the
simulator interatively resolving hoies and non-
determinism, yielding an exeution trae.
Furthermore, by omposing in parallel a pro-
ess whih plays the role of an implementation
environment, i.e. resolves hoies in a partiu-
lar manner, the speiation an be exeuted
aording to a partiular implementation poliy.
This is equivalent to imposing partiular imple-
mentation assumptions, i.e. in the terminology of
[Cooper et al., 1996℄ enforing \below the line" as-
sumptions. By hanging this implementation envi-
ronment proess we an assess the eets of dier-
ent implementation assumptions (e.g. dierent in-
terpretations of blending) in the same manner as
[Cooper et al., 1996℄.
Goal Veriation. By assoiating a logi with
our proess alulus we an assert properties/goals
of a speiation of a ognitive model (as illustrated
in our ase study disussion whih follows shortly).
Furthermore, non-determinism possesses very nie
mathematial properties in this respet. For exam-
ple, it an be shown that for any negative property
(see [Bowman, 1998℄ and the next setion) that,
if the property holds over a speiation S
it will also hold over any speiation that
is \more deterministi" than S.
In terms of the irrelevant speiation problem
this implies that any negative property that we an
dedue from our abstrat speiation of the og-
nitive model will also hold over its onrete imple-
mentations. This is a very valuable methodologi-
al devie. For example, muh of the reasoning we
an make with our \most abstrat" interpretation
of blending will hold for all its instantiations.
CASE STUDY
[Bowman, 1998℄ desribes a speiation and then
analysis of ICS in the ontext of a number of suh
speeh/gesture goals. We summarise this work
here.
Speiation. A LOTOS speiation of ICS is
given. Semantially, LOTOS speiations an be
interpreted as a set of state sequenes, alled inter-
vals
4
. We let 
(S) denote the intervals of a spe-
iation S. Then an interval temporal logi is in-
trodued whih an be used to formulate ognitive
goals of ICS. It is interpreted over intervals. Thus,
giving a semanti link to the LOTOS speiation.
Goal Formulation. The apabilities of ICS to
perform ombined speeh and gesture tasks is on-
sidered. Suh deiti interation is a good example
of multi-modal human-omputer interation. Anal-
ysis of suh ombined speeh and gesture modali-
ties is partiularly signiant sine it addresses a
ommon myth in HCI, whih is that sine human
to human ommuniation ommonly ombines suh
modes of interation, it should be beneial to de-
vise similar ombinations of human-omputer inter-
ations. The analyse proeeds by rst formulating
the ognitive goals that are of interest. These goals
ome in two varieties - negative and positive goals.
















Suh an interval an be viewed as a run/exeution of the
speiation.
where, ICS is the LOTOS speiation of ICS;
S j=  states that the speiation S satises the
formula ; r
i
are representations and 3
a
 holds over
an interval whih ontains a subinterval where  
holds. Informally, this property states that it is
not possible to speak one representation and loate
(i.e. point at with, say a mouse) a dierent repre-
sentation at the \same" time
5
.
A typial positive property whih, informally,
states that it is possible to speak and loate the
same representation at the \same" time, would be:







Analysis. Simulation and dedutive reasoning are
used. Properties of the form of the above negative
property are veried using dedutive reasoning in
the logi. In ontrast, positive properties are ver-
ied by interatively onstruting a fullling trae
using the simulation tool LOLA.
Using these analysis tehniques both the above
properties an be shown to hold.
CONCLUSIONS
There is a spetrum of available modelling teh-
niques with the two extremes being programming
based approahes, suh as those typially used to
implement ognitive models, e.g. the LISP pro-
grams underlying SOAR, and abstrat uses of
mathematial logi, e.g. temporal logi
6
. A weak-
ness of the former approahes is that they are of-
ten too presriptive, foring a partiular \meha-
nisti" interpretation on the ognitive model, leav-
ing it unlear whih aspet of the programs be-
haviour results from the ognitive model and whih
arises from implementation deisions. In formal
terms, programs only haraterise a single imple-
mentation. In ontrast, abstrat logial tehniques
an haraterise a set of possible implementations.
Thus, enabling speiation whih is not presrip-
tive about implementation details. However, logial
desriptions typially fail to support exeution of a
speiation, even in a simulated form.
Proess aluli an be seen to sit between these
two extremes. Firstly, the LOTOS speiation we
have given enables simulated exeution. Seondly,
proess aluli provide tehniques for avoiding over-
presriptive desription. In partiular, they faili-
tate loose speiation by allowing desriptions to
ontain non-determinism.
5
Atually, the use of dierent representations here is





sentations with dierent psyhologial subjets.
6
Note that here we do not mean logi programming ap-
proahes, rather we refer to pure abstrat logi, whih in
ontrast to Prolog say, does not ontain framing of data.
In onlusion, as stated at the start of this paper,
using an appropriate modelling notation an be a
great enabler to \problem solving". This extended
abstrat has argued that a number of aspets of
proess auli suggest they may be an appropri-
ate modelling notation in the domain of onurrent
ognitive arhitetures.
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